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Abstract
This study examines the dynamic relationship between changes in oil prices and the economic
policy uncertainty index for a sample of both net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries
over the period 1997:01–2013:06. To achieve that, we extend the Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012)
dynamic spillover index using structural decomposition. The results reveal that economic policy
uncertainty (oil price shocks) responds negatively to aggregate demand oil price shocks (economic
policy uncertainty shocks). Furthermore, during the Great Recession of 2007–2009, total spillovers
increase considerably, reaching unprecedented heights. Moreover, in net terms, economic policy
uncertainty becomes the dominant transmitter of shocks between 1997 and 2009, while in the
post–2009 period there is a significant role for supply–side and oil specific demand shocks, as net
transmitters of spillover effects. These results are important for policy makers, as well as, investors
interested in the oil market.
Keywords: Policy uncertainty, Oil price shock, Spillover index, Structural Vector
Autoregression, Variance Decomposition, Impulse Response Function
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses an important question, which has recently emerged in the economic litera-
ture; that is, the relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty. In particular,
the aim of this paper is to examine spillovers between Brent crude oil prices and the Baker et al.
(2013) economic policy uncertainty. To achieve that, we extend the spillover index approach by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012), using structural decomposition rather than Choleski decompo-
sition (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009) or generalized forecast error variance decomposition (Diebold
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and Yilmaz, 2012). Furthermore, in order to generate more informative results, we disentangle oil
price shocks according to their origin (i.e. supply–side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil
specific demand shocks), as in Kilian and Park (2009), and we then investigate the spillover effects
between these disaggregated shocks and the economic policy uncertainty indices. The countries
under investigation are the US, Canada, China, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, as
well as, the aggregate Europe. The study uses monthly data over the period 1997:01–2013:06.
The choice of countries, as well as, the sample period is governed by the data availability of the
economic policy uncertainty indices.
This study builds on the work of Kang and Ratti (2013) who examine the effects of oil price
shocks on economic policy uncertainty in the US, using a Structural VAR framework. They find
that positive aggregate demand shocks exercise a significant negative effect on policy uncertainty,
whereas oil specific demand shocks have the opposite effect. Furthermore, supply–side shocks do
not seem to exert any effect.
In order to examine the spillover effects between oil prices (or their shocks) and economic
policy uncertainty, first we need to explain their causal relationship. We argue that bidirectional
relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty exists, and therefore we posit the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Increases in oil prices raise economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we postulate
that negative effects of oil prices on economic activity and inflation put additional pressure on
policy decision making, which ultimately leads to increased economic policy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 2 : Economic policy uncertainty also affects oil prices. Specifically, policy decisions have
a direct effect on firm investment and production decisions, which further impact demand for oil
and thus its price.
To elaborate further, we start our analysis with the investigation of the effects of oil prices
on economic policy. Since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983), mounting empirical evidence
indicates that oil prices exercise a strong negative influence on the economy. More specifically,
past evidence suggest that there are significant effects of oil prices on industrial production and
inflation (see, inter alia, Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2013; Balke et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Du
et al., 2010; Filis, 2010; Peter Ferderer, 1997). Furthermore, authors such as, Rahman and Serletis
(2011), Elder and Serletis (2010), Cologni and Manera (2008), Cunado and Pe´rez de Gracia (2005),
Lee et al. (1995) and Hamilton (1983) confirm that the US economic activity has been significantly
affected by rises in the oil prices, as well as, by the uncertainty about future oil price changes.
Along similar lines, Montoro (2012) and Natal (2012) also establish the link between increased
inflation and low production output given an oil price increase. As it is understood, this trade-off
raises the concerns of and creates pressure to the policymakers with regard to choosing the most
appropriate response towards these oil price effects. A much earlier study by Gelb (1988) provides
a more direct relationship between oil prices and economic policy, by showing that increased oil
prices cause a rise in federal government purchases. Furthermore, a recent study by El Anshasy and
Bradley (2012) which focuses on oil exporting economies, suggests that higher oil prices increase
the government size, which it turn, raises concerns regarding its efficient operation.
We further our analysis by focusing on the effects of economic policy on oil prices. Economic
policy decisions have an immediate effect on economic activity. For example, Bloom (2009) empha-
sises the effects of economic policy uncertainty on the business cycle. Antonakakis et al. (2013) find
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that aggregate demand oil price shocks and US recessions affect negatively dynamic correlations of
stock market returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty. Furthermore, uncertainty pertain-
ing to economic policy decisions, regardless of its origin (i.e. whether the uncertainty originates
from potential fiscal or monetary policy decisions), discourages firms’ investing activity not only
because firms are uncertain about future aggregate demand but also because it puts upward pres-
sure on financing costs (see, among others, Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
et al., 2011; Byrne and Davis, 2004). As expected, lower investment levels will lead to reduced
demand for oil, pushing its price downwards. Malliaris and Malliaris (2013) also maintain that
inflationary pressures exercise a significant impact on oil prices.
All that said, the aforementioned studies do not distinguish between the various types of oil
price shocks. Several authors have documented the significance of disentangling oil price shocks
in order to assess their true impact on the economy (see, among others, Degiannakis et al., 2014;
Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Kilian and Lewis, 2011; Filis et al., 2011;
Kilian and Park, 2009). The pioneers of the notion of oil price shocks are Hamilton (2009a,b)
and Kilian (2009b). In particular, Hamilton (2009a,b) identifies two oil price shocks, that is;
demand–side oil price shocks, which originate from changes in aggregate demand, and supply–side
oil price shocks, which originate from changes in oil production. Kilian (2009b) further disentangles
demand–side shocks into two components, i.e. aggregate demand shocks (similar to the Hamilton
(2009a,b) classification) and oil specific demand shocks, which are related to the uncertainty of the
future availability of oil.
Having established the potential relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil,
this study assesses spillover effects between oil prices (or their shocks) and the economic policy
uncertainty. We make an important contribution to the existing literature as (i) this study is the
first to examines time-varying spillover effects between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty,
(ii) it investgates both the effects of oil prices and oil price shocks and (iii) it adds to the limited
number of studies pertaining to Baker et al. (2013) economic policy uncertainty index.
Our findings suggest that according to the impulse response function analysis, there is a negative
response from both policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices to respective shocks from each
variable. Classifying oil price shocks into supply–side, aggregate demand and oil specific demand
shocks, we report that economic policy uncertainty responds only to aggregate demand shocks
(negatively), whereas all three types of shocks are negatively influenced by policy uncertainty
innovations. Furthermore, time-varying total spillovers between economic policy uncertainty and
changes in oil prices range between 10%–25% in the pre–2007 period. During the Great Recession
of 2007–2009 we observe a significant peak in spillovers, which ranges between 40%–50%, depending
on the country. When we disentangle oil price shocks, then total spillovers significantly increase,
reaching even the level of 75%. Net–spillovers suggest that the main transmitter of shocks is the
economic policy uncertainty up until the end of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, while in the years
that followed it is the changes in oil prices that assume this role. Once we disaggregate oil price
shocks into their three components, we observe that all variables can be either net transmitters
or net recipients of spillover shocks, depending on the time period. Finally, results are qualitative
similar for both net oil–exporters and net oil–importers.
Overall, the findings suggest that unless we disentangle oil price shocks and proceed with a
time-varying framework, we are not able to capture the full dynamics of the relationship between
oil and economic policy uncertainty. These results are important for policy makers, as well as,
investors, considering the dynamic interaction between oil and economic policy uncertainty. To be
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more explicit it is important for investors to understand that during turbulent periods attention
should be drawn to economic policy uncertainty, considering the fact that the latter affects the
market in which they operate. On the other hand, policy makers should be cautious when formu-
lating macroeconomic policies at relatively tranquil times, as oil price shocks could undermine the
successful outcomes of these policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology
and describes the data. Section 3 presents the empirical findings, and Section 4 summarises and
concludes the paper.
2. Empirical Methodology and Data
2.1. Spillover methodology
The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the seminal work
on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decompositions. It allows
an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables to the forecast error variances of both the
respective and the other variables of the model. Using rolling-window estimation, the evolution of
spillover effects can be traced over time and illustrated by spillover plots. Starting point for the
analysis is the following p–order, N–variable VAR
yt =
P∑
i=1
Θiyt−i + εt (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yNt) is a N × 1 vector of N endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P, are
N ×N parameter matrices and εt ∼ (0,Σ) is a N ×1 vector of disturbances that are independently
distributed over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and n = 1, ..., N is the variable index.
Key to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of model (1), which
is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0 Ajεt−j , where the N ×N coefficient matrices Aj are recursively defined as
Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . .+ ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the N ×N identity matrix and Aj = 0 for
j < 0.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) use Cholesky decomposition, which yields variance decompositions
dependent on the ordering of the variables, whereas Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) extend the Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009) model, using the generalized VAR framework of Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran
and Shin (1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant to the order of the variables. Both
models yield an N × N matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...N , where each entry gives the contribution
of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable i. The main diagonal elements contain the
(own) contributions of shocks to the variable i to its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal
elements show the (cross) contributions of the other variables j to the forecast error variance of
variable i.
Since the own– and cross–variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under the
generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposition matrix
is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑N
j=1 φij(H)
(2)
with
∑N
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = N by construction.
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This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index, which is given by
TS(H) =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (3)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the total
forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by considering
directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable i from all other
variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
N
× 100 (4)
and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
N
× 100. (5)
Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into those
coming from (or to) a particular source.
By subtracting Equation (4) from Equation (5) the net spillovers from variable i to all other
variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (6)
providing information on whether a variable is a receiver or transmitter of shocks in net terms. Put
differently, Equation (6) provides summary information about how much each variable contributes
to the volatility in other variables, in net terms.
Finally, the net pairwise spillovers can be calculated as
NPSij(H) = (
φ˜ji(H)∑N
i,m=1 φ˜im(H)
− φ˜ij(H)∑N
j,m=1 φ˜jm(H)
)× 100
= (
φ˜ji(H)− φ˜ij(H)
N
)× 100. (7)
The net pairwise volatility spillover between variables i and j is simply the difference between the
gross volatility shocks transmitted from variable i to variable j and those transmitted from j to i.
The spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdependence across coun-
tries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source and recipient.
The key innovation and contribution in this study is that, instead of using Cholesky or Gener-
alised variance decomposition, so as to obtain the total, directional and net spillover indexes, we
adopt a Structural variance decomposition methodology, as it allows the identification of oil price
shocks. The choice of structural variance decomposition is predicated upon our empirical exercise.
That is, to examine the effects of oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty. In particular,
we disaggregate oil price shocks based on the framework of Kilian and Park (2009). Essentially,
with the use of a Structural VAR (SVAR) model, we distinguish between three types of oil price
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shocks; namely, supply–side shocks (SS), aggregate demand demand (ADS), as well as, oil specific
shocks (OSS); and by including the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013) in
the SVAR, we assess the effects of oil price shocks on economic policy uncertainty. The first type
of shock is typically associated with changes in world oil production, whereas the second and the
third type of shocks relate to changes in global economic activity and to concerns regarding the
future availability of oil, respectively.
For the general case of a p–order Structural VAR model, we obtain the following standard
representation:
A0yt = c0 +
∑p
i=1
Aiyt−i + εt (8)
where, yt is a [N × 1] vector of endogenous variables. In this paper, first, N=2 when we assess the
relationship between oil price returns and economic policy uncertainty. For the relationship among
the three oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty, N=4, containing world oil production,
the global economic activity index, real oil price returns and the economic policy uncertainty index,
noting that the order of the variables is important. A0 represents the [N × N ] contemporaneous
matrix, Ai are [N × N ] autoregressive coefficient matrices, εt is a [N × 1] vector of structural
disturbances, assumed to have zero covariance and be serially uncorrelated. The covariance matrix
of the structural disturbances takes the following form:
For N=2:
E[εtε
′
t] = D =
[
σ21 0
0 σ22
]
(9)
For N=4
E[εtε
′
t] = D =

σ21 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0
0 0 σ23 0
0 0 0 σ24
 (10)
In order to get the reduced form of our structural model (8) we multiply both sides with A−10 ,
such as that:
yt = a0 +
∑p
i=1
Biyt−i + et (11)
where a0 = A
−1
0 c0, Bi = A
−1
0 Ai, and et = A
−1
0 εt, i.e. εt = A0et. The reduced form errors et
are linear combinations of the structural errors et, with a covariance matrix of the form E[ete
′
t] =
A−10 DA
−1′
0 .
Imposing suitable restrictions on A−10 will help identify the structural disturbances of the model.
In particular, for N=2 we impose the following short-run restrictions:
 e∆Real Oil Prices1,t
e
Economic Policy Uncertainty
2,t
 = [ α11 0
α21 α22
]
×
[
εOPS1,t
εEPS2,t
]
(12)
where OPS =oil price shock and EPS =economic policy uncertainty shock.
For N=4, the restriction are as follows:
e∆Oil Production1,t
e
Real Global Economic Activity
2,t
e∆Real Oil Prices3,t
e
∆Economic Policy Uncertainty
4,t
 =

α11 0 0 0
α21 α22 0 0
α31 α32 α33 0
α41 α42 α43 α44
×

εSS1,t
εADS2,t
εOSS3,t
εEPS4,t
 (13)
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where SS =supply–side shock, ADS =aggregate demand shock and OSS =oil specific demand
shock and EPS =economic policy uncertainty shock.
The purpose of the short–run restrictions we impose on the model is to help us identify the
underlying oil price shocks, similarly with Kilian and Park (2009). According to the restrictions
for N=4, high adjustment costs forbid oil production to contemporaneously respond to changes
in demand for oil. Furthermore, changes in the supply of oil are allowed to contemporaneously
affect both global economic activity and the price of oil. In addition, given that it takes some time
for the global economy to react to changes in the price of oil, global economic activity is assumed
not to receive contemporaneous feedback from oil prices. However, changes in aggregate economic
activity is expected to have a contemporaneous impact on oil prices and this is at large explained
by the instantaneous response of commodities markets. Furthermore, it is understandable that oil
price developments can be triggered by all types of shocks and in this regard all types of shocks
are assumed to contemporaneously affect oil prices. Finally, economic policy uncertainty index
responds contemporaneously to all aforementioned oil price shocks.
2.2. Data description
In this study we use monthly data of the economic policy uncertainty indices for Canada, China,
EU, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US. The series come from Baker et al. (2013).
In addition, monthly data have been collected for oil prices, world oil production and the real global
economic activity index (GEA), which are used for the estimation of oil price shocks. Data for the
Brent crude oil price and world oil production have been extracted from the Energy Information
Administration, whereas the data for the real global economic activity index have been retrieved
from Lutz Kilian’s personal website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼lkilian/). The period of
study runs from 1997:01 until 2013:06. Oil prices and world oil production are expressed in log-
returns. Furthermore, oil prices are transformed in real terms. Table 1 reports the descriptive
statistics of the series.
Insert Table 1 here
As evident in Table 1, economic policy uncertainty indices have comparable mean values, with
the exception of Canada and the UK which exhibit the lowest and highest mean values, respectively.
Economic policy uncertainty indices are fairly volatile, as shown by the standard deviation, the
minimum and the maximum values. With regard to oil price changes, we observe a positive
average value, with quite a high standard deviation. Furthermore, none of the series is normally
distributed, as indicated by the skewness, kurtosis and the Jarque-Bera statistic. Finally, according
to the ADF–statistic, all variables are stationary.
Figure 1 exhibits the evolution of the series during the sample period.
Insert Figure 1 here
All economic policy uncertainty indices exhibit some common peaks. For example, in all coun-
tries we notice an increase in the level of policy uncertainty during the period 2002–2003 (war in
Afghanistan and second war in Iraq), the Great Recession of 2007–2009, as well as, during the Eu-
ropean Debt crisis in 2011, signifying the increase of policy uncertainty during turbulent economic
periods. Finally, the effects of the Great Recession of 2007–2009 can also be observed on oil price
changes, which significantly declined in 2009.
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3. Empirical Results
3.1. Impulse Response Effects
We begin our analysis by concentrating on the impulse response functions between oil prices and
economic policy uncertainty. In particular, we seek to portray not only a narrow setting which
merely describes the relationship between shocks in policy uncertainty and oil prices, but also, a
broader framework which allows for the introduction of a disaggregated approach towards oil price
shocks, and thus considers supply–side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil specific demand
shocks, separately.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 present the structural impulse response functions of our different specifica-
tions of model 8 for a time period of 24–months. The upper and lower error bands with percentiles
of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, are constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
Figure 2 reports the structural impulse responses of oil prices to one standard deviation shock
to policy uncertainty (left column), and the structural impulse responses of policy uncertainty to
one standard deviation shock to oil prices (right column) based on the SVARs with oil prices and
policy uncertainty as the endogenous variables for each country.
According to this figure we see that, in general, a surprise increase in economic policy uncer-
tainty shock leads to a very short–lived and statistically significant drop in the price of oil in a
window between one and three months. The effect of an unanticipated positive oil price shock
leads to a statistically significant decline on policy uncertainty which is more persistent and more
pronounced for some countries. The fact that policy uncertainty responds negatively to positive
changes in oil prices, is counter–intuitive. The peculiar feature of these results might be masked
due to the aggregate measure of oil price shocks. In other words, we maintain that the disaggre-
gation of oil price shocks could provide a clearer picture with reference to the impulse response
functions.
Insert Figure 2 here
Therefore, in Figures 3 and 4, we report the structural impulse responses of supply–side (SS),
aggregate demand (ADS) and oil specific demand shocks (OSS) to one standard deviation shock
to policy uncertainty (see, Figure 3), and the structural impulse responses of policy uncertainty
to one standard deviation shock to supply–side (SS), aggregate demand (ADS) and oil specific
demand shocks (OSS)(see, Figure 4). According to these figures, the picture that emerges becomes
more clear.
In particular, unanticipated innovations to policy uncertainty do not seem to cause any signif-
icant effects on supply–side shocks (SS) before 4 months have passed. At that time we observe a
negative and significant response of the supply–side shocks to policy uncertainty innovations. This
is suggestive of the fact that positive policy uncertainty unanticipated shocks trigger a decrease in
oil production, which is somewhat expected. Furthermore, unanticipated innovations to policy un-
certainty lead to significant reduction of aggregate demand shocks (ADS) and oil specific demand
shocks (OSS) as reported in Figure 3. The fact that ADS respond negatively to policy uncertainty
shocks is explained by the fact that the latter is causing a reduction in aggregate demand, which
in turn, drives oil prices at lower levels. In addition, the same response is expected regarding the
OSS given that increased policy uncertainty is conducive to lower demand for oil, and thus lower
uncertainty about its future availability. These results are also in line with Kang and Ratti (2013).
Turning our attention to policy uncertainty responses to oil price shocks, we find that unantic-
ipated positive supply–side shocks do not exert a significant effect on economic policy uncertainty
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(with the exception of Italy for which a significantly positive effect is reported). This result ac-
cords with the related literature which maintains that supply–side shocks are no longer important
for macroeconomic developments (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Lippi and
Nobili, 2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b). Furthermore, unanticipated positive aggregate demand shocks
(ADS) lead to lower levels of policy uncertainty. This is expected as rises in aggregate demand, de-
spite the fact that push oil prices upwards, are regarded as positive information, reflecting booming
economic conditions and thus lowering policy uncertainty. This is partly in line with Antonakakis
et al. (2013) who find that aggregate demand oil price shocks affect negatively the dynamic correla-
tions of stock market returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty. Oil specific demand shocks
do not seem to trigger significant responses from policy uncertainty, with the exception of Canada,
EU and France. Policy uncertainty in France, exhibits a persistent negative response to oil specific
demand shocks, whereas respective responses are short–lived for Canada and the EU. This results
is expected for Canada given its net–exporting character. Nevertheless, it is counter–intuitive for
France and the EU and this deserves further attention.
Finally, we can observe that the negative response of economic policy uncertainty to positive
oil price innovations that was reported in Figure 2 is mainly driven by aggregate demand shocks
(ADS), which confirms our initial claim that unless we disaggregate oil price shocks by virtue of
their origin we cannot attain a deeper understanding of the issue at hand. These results reveal the
dominance of aggregate demand shocks, rather than supply–side and oil specific demand shocks,
as a source of policy uncertainty innovations.
Insert Figure 3 here
Insert Figure 4 here
Having established the main transmission channels pertaining to the variables of interest, we
proceed with the analysis of their spillover effects, which constitutes the main research objective
of this study.
3.2. Total spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil prices
Spillover effects between policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices are presented in Table 2.
Evidence show a quite low average effect, with the exception of Canada and France, where the av-
erage total spillover index is 12.6% and 12.1%, respectively. The lowest score is reported for Italy.
Overall, the total spillover indices illustrate that, on average, there is a weak–to–moderate interde-
pendence between oil and economic policy uncertainty for most countries. Average net spillovers
for the whole sample demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty is the net transmitter of shocks
for China, EU aggregate, Germany, the UK, as well as, the US (see, Table 2). Nevertheless, net
spillovers, on average, are relatively small.
Insert Table 2 here
Turning our attention to spillover indices based on the disaggregated oil price shocks (see,
Table 3), we observe that total spillovers and net spillovers, increase in magnitude. In addition,
it is evident that this magnitude is pretty similar for all the countries in our sample. Moreover,
considering all three types of oil shocks, we observe that economic policy uncertainty acts as a
net recipient of spillover shocks only in the cases of Spain and Germany, whereas it remains a net
9
transmitter of spillover shocks for all other countries in our sample (Table 3). It is also worth
noting that aggregate demand oil price shocks (ADS) behave as net transmitters for all countries
but China. This accords with related literature which emphasises the importance of demand–side
shocks, as opposed to supply–side shocks (see, among others, Baumeister and Peersman, 2013;
Lippi and Nobili, 2012; Hamilton, 2009a,b).
Insert Table 3 here
Our analysis so far is based on single fixed parameters. Despite the fact that Tables 2 and
3 show some interesting information, we should not lose sight of the fact that during our sample
period several events took place, such as the was in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Great Recession
of 2007–2009 and the European debt crisis. Hence, the average values presented in Tables 2 and
3 are not expected to hold for the whole time span. Thus, it would be valuable to examine how
these spillovers evolve over time. Therefore we proceed with our analysis by presenting the total
and net spillovers using 60–month rolling samples. It should be underlined that different forecast
horizons (from 5 up to 15 months) and different window lengths (48 and 72) were also considered
and the results were qualitatively similar. Thus, we maintain that the results are not sensitive to
the choice of the forecast horizon or the length of the rolling–windows.
The time–varying spillover indices are illustrated in Figure 5. The dotted line represents the
intertemporal progression of the total spillover indices between policy uncertainty and changes in
oil prices, while the solid line, represents the intertemporal progression of the total spillover indices
corresponding to the relation between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks (disaggregated shocks
in virtue of their origin).
Insert Figure 5 here
Starting with spillovers between shocks in economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices,
we observe that for most countries, in the period preceding the Great Recession, total spillovers
fluctuate within a range between 10% and 25%. Furthermore, this range of fluctuation is relatively
stable for almost all countries under examination. The only exception to these findings is France,
in which total spillover shocks, in the pre Great Recession period, reach a high at almost 40%.
During the years of the Great Recession, total spillovers increase considerably reaching unprece-
dented heights during the peak of the Great Recession (i.e. mid–2008 until early–2009). In the
period succeeding the Great Recession (i.e. post–2009) total spillovers return to a stable fluctuation
pattern, realised within the same range as in the pre-crisis period, for all countries with the excep-
tion of Canada. Evidently, for Canada, the post-crisis period is characterised by a higher level of
total spillovers. Turning to total spillovers between shocks in economic policy uncertainty and oil
price shocks, the picture is somewhat different. To begin with, total spillovers fluctuate at a much
higher range (i.e. between 50% and 75%) throughout the period of study. Next, although it is a
fact that during the peak years of the Great Recession total spillovers reach very high levels, one
could not argue that these levels are indeed unprecedented. Finally, with the exception of Spain,
total spillovers appear to revert back to their pre-crisis fluctuation patterns. Interestingly enough,
in European countries, Italy aside, another peak of the total spillover indices is observed in the
beginning of 2011, which coincides with increased concerns regarding the migration of the effects
of the debt crisis from Eurozone peripheral countries to the rest of Europe. The aforementioned
findings constitute an indication that unless we disentangle oil prices by virtue of their shocks,
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we are not able to extract all relevant information. However, in order to provide a more in-depth
analysis of the results, we proceed with reporting country specific total spillover effects.
In the section that follows, we provide additional information aiming to attain deeper knowledge
of the evolution of spillover effects over time in each one of the countries of our sample. We begin
by identifying the net spillover transmitters.
3.3. Net spillover transmitters and recipients
By concentrating on net directional spillovers we can deduce whether one of the variables is either
a net transmitter or a net receiver of spillover effects within a particular country. Initially we
investigate the spillover effects between policy uncertainty and changes in oil prices. Results are
shown in Figure 6. Policy uncertainty is considered to be a net transmitter when spillovers appear
on the negative lower area of each panel.
Insert Figure 6 here
As can be seen in Figure 6, the early period of our study is characterised by the net transmitting
behaviour of policy uncertainty. Although, this does not hold true for France and Italy, where for
the most period preceding the Great Recession, oil prices are the net transmitters of shocks. With
reference to the Great Recession of 2007–2009, we observe that policy uncertainty assumes an even
greater net transmitting role, suggested by the trough of the time-varying net spillover indices.
Prominent among the results is that the this trough is observed at different phases of the Great
Recession. Stellar examples of this, include France, Germany and the UK. As far as the former is
concerned, the net transmitting character of economic policy uncertainty is observed in the early
stages of the Great Recession. In the cases of Germany and the UK, it is during the the last year
of the Great Recession that economic policy uncertainty assumes the net transmitting character.
Furthermore, in the years after 2009, which marked the beginning of the recovery of the global
economy, the contribution of policy uncertainty to spillover effects is diminishing (see the upward
trend in almost all panels of Figure 6) in almost all countries of our sample. Even more, with the
exception of Spain and Italy, oil prices are net transmitters of shocks from 2010 onwards, although
their contribution is clearly diminishing during 2012–2013. The latter observation particularly
holds for the European countries which experience the consequences of the ongoing Eurozone
crisis. The fact that for Spain and Italy economic policy uncertainty retains its net transmitting
character, even after the Great Recession, can be explained by the strong economic impact that
the Eurozone crisis exerted on these two countries. Thus, we maintain that at times of economic
turbulence, oil prices are the net recipients of shocks, suggesting that they are influenced by the
policy uncertainty which emerges during these periods.
In order to gain a clearer perception of the situation, we proceed with our analysis by presenting
net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks. This information is presented in
Figures 7, 8 and 9. Each country is associated with three panels while each panel represents one
of the three possible types of oil price shocks, as these were earlier defined in the study. As before,
policy uncertainty is considered to be a net transmitter of spillover effects every time the net effect
(depicted by the solid line) lies within the negative lower area of each panel. We have also included
a dotted line which pertains to the results presented in Figure 6, to allow direct comparisons. By
so doing, we are able to trace the contribution of each type of oil price shock and produce a more
credible interpretation of the results.
Insert Figure 7 here
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Insert Figure 8 here
Insert Figure 9 here
Results presented on Figures 7, 8 and 9 confirm our anticipation that disaggregated oil price
shocks are more informative in relation to the spillover effects between oil and policy uncertainty.
More specifically, we notice that spillovers occur between policy uncertainty and aggregate demand
shocks, rather than between policy uncertainty and supply–side or oil specific demand shocks.
Furthermore, we observe that the magnitude of spillover effects is considerably smaller compared
to Figure 6. In order to gain a deeper understanding of these net spillover effects, we proceed with
country–specific results.
Starting with Canada (see, Figure 7) the period before and during the Great Recession is
characterised by the net transmitting role of economic policy uncertainty, as far as supply–side
and oil specific demand shocks are concerned. By contrast, we observe that for the same period,
economic policy uncertainty is a net receiver of spillover effects with regard to aggregate demand
shocks. Interestingly enough, in Canada, which is a net oil–exporting country, in the years that
followed the Great Recession, it is only the oil specific demand shocks that contribute to the forecast
error of policy uncertainty, whereas, supply–side and aggregate demand shocks appear to have no
effect at all. A potential explanation of this result may lie within the arguments put forward by
authors such as Auty and Gelb (2001), Lane (2003), as well as, Afonso and Furceri (2010) who
identify a strong link between resource-revenues – such as revenues from oil – and fiscal policy. To
elaborate further, Sturm et al. (2009) argue that public finances of resource-abundant countries
may exhibit high levels of volatility depending on the whims of oil prices and demand for oil and
thus they constitute a major source of uncertainty within the country. This is a very crucial insight
as in relatively tranquil times the macroeconomic policy of the net oil exporting country appears
to have a strong link to demand-side oil price shocks.
According to IEA (2013) China is the second largest crude net oil–importer in the world.
Interestingly enough, Figure 7 reveals similar results for China to those of Canada. Again, we notice
that the aggregate demand shocks are the main source of spillover effect on policy uncertainty.
Nevertheless, in the latter period of our study, supply–side and oil specific demand shocks assume
a net transmitting character. Authors such as Yuan et al. (2008) highlight the strong nexus
between oil and economic growth in China and stress the need for the Chinese Government to set
up a national policy regarding the accumulation of a strategic level of oil reserves. According to
Yuan et al. (2008), future availability of oil is a major concern within China and abrupt rises in
the price of oil are generally the source of serious economic concerns, resulting in higher level of
policy uncertainty. The necessity for national planning, targeting energy security, has also been
brought up by authors such as Zhang et al. (2009) and Ma et al. (2011). In addition, Ma et al.
(2012) emphasize the lack of some appropriate national policy with respect to energy resources
in general and oil reserves in particular, which could help stave off future energy turbulence and
secure a solid path of economic growth. This will in turn ease the formulation and implementation
of macroeconomic policies.
We further our analysis with the European countries, which are net oil–importers. In this
regard, part of the analysis in connection with China may also apply to most European countries
and especially to countries in which oil is a major input of production. To be more explicit,
uncertainty regarding both the future level of the price of oil and its future availability could
influence their output level. In Figure 7, we can observe that policy uncertainty in the period
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that followed the Great Recession was mainly a net recipient of spillover effects transmitted by
the supply–side and oil specific demand shocks. Further, empirical findings concerning individual
European countries reveal a similar picture (see, Figures 8 and 9). Notable exceptions in these
pattern are Spain and the UK. In the case of Spain, policy uncertainty appears to be the main
transmitter of spillover effects, throughout our sample period. Although for the period of the Great
Recession, both supply–side and aggregate demand shocks exhibit a net transmitting role. As far
as the UK is concerned, it is also the aggregate demand shocks that transmit spillover effects to
policy uncertainty even in the years succeeding the Great Recession.
Both demand–side shocks are important for Germany, although at different time periods. Ac-
cording to Carstensen et al. (2013) Germany in 2009 experienced one of its greatest economic
downturns ever and that according to the author can be attributed not only to the financial crisis
per se, but also, to developments in the market for crude oil (see also, Hamilton, 2009a; Kilian,
2009a). Most importantly, Carstensen et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting that in the short
run, despite the appreciation of oil prices due to aggregate demand shocks, an exporting country
can enjoy economic benefits due to higher demand for its products. In the longer term, though,
reduced domestic consumption, due to inflationary pressures driven by higher oil prices, dominate
the economy and could potentially lead to recession. Understandably, this would increase policy
uncertainty within the country. Carstensen et al. (2013) put forward the argument that this is
exactly what happened in Germany and this is why although the price of crude oil peaked in mid–
2008, the German economy did not enter a recession until 2009. This could potentially explain
why rises in the price of oil that are related to booming global economic conditions can aggra-
vate expectation regarding macroeconomic policy conduct, even in an economy which is heavily
export-oriented, such as Germany. It is understandable that the foregone analysis can also apply
to the rest of Europe; in fact, it may be even more appropriate considering that all other European
countries export much less commodities than Germany.
According to the IEA (2013), the US economy is the world’s top crude oil–importer. As evident
in Figure 9, the net spillover behaviour for the US resembles the previous cases, although with
some minor differences. More specifically, net spillover effects between supply–side or oil specific
demand shocks and policy uncertainty are very close zero for the pre-crisis period, whereas, for
the same period, aggregate demand shocks are net transmitters of spillover effects. Notably, from
2009 onwards it is mainly the supply–side shocks that transmit spillover effects to economic policy
uncertainty, although a peak in net spillovers deriving from oil specific demand shocks is observed
for the latter years of the sample period. Despite the arguments put forward by Baumeister and
Peersman (2013), among others, that supply–side shocks have a small role to play in the US
economy, as opposed to demand–side shocks, we provide evidence that the former shocks have
indeed a role to play in economic policy uncertainty developments.
In retrospect, we find that there is not one single net transmitter of spillover shocks, but rather
all variables assume this character at different time periods. This is suggestive of the fact that
there is no constant relationship between oil price shocks and economic policy uncertainty and
even more this relationship varies with the type of oil price shock. In this regard, claims about the
relationship between economic policy uncertainty and oil price shocks, based one static estimates,
may not reveal the whole picture and, in cases, they may be misleading. Finally, distinguishing
oil price shocks by virtue of their origin and investigating net spillover effects in this disaggregated
framework provides a more thorough picture regarding the said relationship. On a final note, it is
worth noting that our findings apply to both net oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries.
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4. Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between oil prices and economic policy uncertainty, using
monthly data on oil and the economic policy uncertainty index produced by Baker et al. (2013),
over the period 1997:01–2013:06. We examine the said relationship by extending the spillover index
approach by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) using structural decomposition. In addition, we
disaggregate oil price shocks by virtue of their origin following Kilian and Park (2009) classification,
and investigate spillover effects between each of these shocks and economic policy uncertainty.
Sample countries include the US, Canada, China, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain and
the aggregate Europe.
According to existing literature, it is anticipated that there is bidirectional relationship be-
tween economic policy uncertainty and oil prices. On one hand, higher oil prices exert negative
impacts on the economy, such as lower productivity and/or higher inflation (see, inter alia, Filis and
Chatziantoniou, 2013; Montoro, 2012; Natal, 2012; Rahman and Serletis, 2011; Balke et al., 2010;
Elder and Serletis, 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Du et al., 2010; Filis, 2010; Cologni and Manera, 2008;
Cunado and Pe´rez de Gracia, 2005; Peter Ferderer, 1997; Hamilton, 1983). Such economic condi-
tions put pressure on policy makers to mitigate the negative effects of increased oil prices, which it
turn, raises concerns regarding the success of these policies. On the other hand, uncertainty sur-
rounding economic policy decisions negatively affects firms’ investment and output decisions (see,
among others, Wang et al., 2014; Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2013, 2012; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.,
2011; Byrne and Davis, 2004). Considering that reduced investment and output levels cause a
downward pressure on oil prices, we opine that economic policy uncertainty exerts an impact on
oil prices.
Impulse response functions suggest that both economic policy uncertainty and changes in oil
prices respond negatively to each others’ shocks. The response from oil prices is expected, given
that increased policy uncertainty may lead to lower productivity, and thus lower demand for oil.
Decomposing oil price shocks, we observe that changes in economic policy uncertainty causes
significantly negative responses from all types of shocks, although there is a delayed response from
the supply–sid shocks. The counter-intuitive response of economic policy uncertainty to changes
in oil prices can be explained by the contribution of aggregate demand shocks, which is clearly
evidenced once oil price shocks are disaggregated. Furthermore, we provide evidence that supply–
side and oil specific demand shocks do not trigger any responses from economic policy uncertainty.
These results are in line with Kang and Ratti (2013).
As far as total spillovers are concerned, we show that spillovers between economic policy uncer-
tainty and changes in oil prices range between 10%–25% in the pre–2007 period. During the Great
Recession of 2007–2009 total spillovers considerably increase reaching unprecedented heights of
about 40% to 50%. With reference to the post–2009 period, total spillovers appear to revert back
to the pre–2007 fluctuations patterns. Turning our attention to net spillover effects, our results
reveal that almost for all countries, economic policy uncertainty is net transmitter throughout the
period up until the end of the Great Recession of 2007–2009. In the post–2009 period economic
policy uncertainty assumes a net receiving role. This result stands to reason, given that the global
economic crisis has ended and thus uncertainty regarding future economic developments reverts to
lower levels.
Once we distinguish between the different oil price shocks, we observe that total spillovers ex-
hibit considerably different patterns and magnitudes. Prominent among our results is the finding
that total spillovers occur between policy uncertainty and aggregate demand shocks, rather than
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policy uncertainty and supply–side or oil specific demand shocks. Net spillovers among policy
uncertainty and the three oil price shocks reveal that any variable can assume either a net trans-
mitting or net receiving character, depending on the time period. In this regard, we maintain that
it is important to investigate this relationship in a dynamic, as opposed to a static framework.
This is suggestive of the fact that unless we use a disaggregated oil price shocks framework,
we are not in the position to gain a thorough understanding on the relationship between economic
policy uncertainty and oil prices. In addition, our results remain qualitatively similar for both net
oil–exporting and net oil–importing countries of our sample.
These results are important for policy makers, as well as, investors who are interested in the
oil market. To be more explicit it is important for investors to understand that during turbulent
periods attention should be drawn to economic policy uncertainty, considering the fact that the
latter affects the market in which they operate. On the other hand, policy makers should be
cautious when formulating macroeconomic policies at relatively tranquil times, as oil price shocks
could undermine the successful outcomes of these policies.
Finally, investigating the relationship between (i) financial sector uncertainty (as this is ap-
proximated by stock market volatility) and oil price shocks, (ii) business sector sentiment and oil
price shocks, as well as, (iii) consumer confidence and oil price shocks, using a similar framework,
could constitute potential avenues for further research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1997:01 until 2013:06
Series Obs Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum Skewness Excess Kurtosis Jarque-Bera ADF
CAN EPU 198 101.7949 39.5358 43.7017 249.2652 1.0228** 0.6428 28.736*** -4.339**
CHN EPU 198 109.8563 67.1629 9.0667 363.5231 1.1818** 1.1866** 43.717** -5.413**
FRA EPU 198 109.4032 50.3866 36.4004 303.4609 0.6546** -0.2152 11.003** -4.918**
GER EPU 198 106.2261 35.0111 42.2477 253.0389 0.9681** 1.0793** 30.713** -5.283**
ITA EPU 198 108.7657 37.4112 40.0090 243.9464 0.9206** 1.0747** 28.406** -4.636**
SPA EPU 150 104.5135 40.6360 28.3315 241.8103 0.6845** 0.4278 12.857** -5.303**
UK EPU 198 117.4592 66.6526 31.8590 297.4211 0.6553** -0.8550* 15.300** -3.596*
US EPU 198 109.8556 38.7015 57.2026 245.1263 0.5250** -0.5026 8.4691* -4.119**
EU EPU 198 108.5708 34.5199 53.3714 213.5486 0.3745 -0.8731* 8.2701* -3.640*
∆(OIL PRICE) 198 0.0074 0.0065 -0.3109 0.2006 -0.7429 0.9128* 24.964** -11.555**
∆(OIL PROD) 198 0.0011 0.0005 -0.0249 0.0259 -0.0600 0.9077* 6.8815* -12.134**
GEA 198 0.0322 0.0202 -0.5025 0.5914 0.1336 -1.0819** 10.2451** -4.071**
Note: ADF denotes Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 5% and 1% critical values of -3.44 and -4.02, respectively.
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2: Spillover table (1997M01 2013M06)
CAN CHN EU
From (j) From (j) From (j)
To (i) OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others
OIL 89.0 11.0 11 93.9 6.1 6.1 87.0 13.0 13.0
EPU 14.2 85.8 14.2 3.5 96.5 3.5 9.0 91.0 9.0
Contr. to others 14.2 11 Tot. Spillover 3.5 6.1 Tot. Spillover 9.0 13.0 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 103.2 96.8 Index=12.6% 97.4 102.6 Index=4.8% 96 104 Index=11.0%
ESP FRA GER
From (j) From (j) From (j)
To (i) OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others
OIL 93.7 6.3 6.3 89.9 10.1 10.1 90.2 9.8 9.8
EPU 7.3 92.7 7.3 14.0 86.0 14.0 5.5 94.5 5.5
Contr. to others 7.3 6.3 Tot. Spillover 14.0 10.1 Tot. Spillover 5.5 98 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 101.0 99.0 Index=6.8% 103.9 96.1 Index=12.1% 15.8 104.2 Index=7.7%
ITA UK US
From (j) From (j) From (j)
To (i) OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others OIL EPU From others
OIL 96.4 3.6 3.6 88.1 11.9 11.9 88.6 11.4 11.4
EPU 4.9 95.1 4.9 3.9 96.1 3.9 3.6 96.4 3.6
Contr. to others 4.9 3.6 Tot. Spillover 3.9 11.9 Tot. Spillover 3.6 11.4 Tot. Spillover
Contr. incl. own 101.3 98.7 Index=4.3% 91.9 108.1 Index=7.9% 92.2 107.8 Index=7.5%
Note: Spillover indices, given by Equations (2)-(6), calculated from variance decompositions based on
12-step-ahead forecasts.
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Figure 1: Time series employed in the study
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Figure 2: Structural impulse responses of oil price (policy uncertainty) to one standard deviation shock to policy
uncertainty (oil price)
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Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are
constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
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Figure 3: Structural impulse responses of SS, ADS and OSS to one standard deviation shock to economic policy
uncertainty
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
 Responses of SS to Policy Uncertainty Shock       Responses of ADS to Policy Uncertainty Shock     Responses of OSS to Policy Uncertainty Shock
CAN
CHN
EU
ESP
FRA
GER
ITA
UK
US
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0.000
0.002
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.002
0.002
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0.00
0.05
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.01
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.01
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.001
0.001
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.05
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-0.02
0.02
Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are
constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
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Figure 4: Structural impulse responses of economic policy uncertainty to one standard deviation shock to SS, ADS
and OSS
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Note: Dashed lines denote the upper and lower error bands with percentiles of 0.16 and 0.84, respectively, and are
constructed using Monte Carlo integration based on 1000 draws.
23
Figure 5: Total spillovers
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Figure 6: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil returns
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Figure 7: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Canada, China and EU
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Figure 8: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Spain, France and Germany
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Figure 9: Net spillovers between policy uncertainty and oil price shocks in Italy, UK and US
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